

ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF POLICE OFFICERS ABOUT VARIOUS FORMS OF RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM IN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA¹

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Abstract: Recently, experts and practitioners alike noted the emergence of security challenges arising from radicalisation, often leading to extreme violence. Radicalisation and violent extremism present a security threat also to Mid Europe and Western Balkan countries. In the past few decades, the Western Balkan countries have been viewed as a breeding ground for religious radicals and violent extremism. Nowadays, the police have assumed a crucial role in facilitating a preventive multi-stakeholder approach at the local or regional levels, particularly in at-risk local settings. The paper presents findings of a study conducted on a sample of 117 students of the Croatian Police College of the Ministry of the Interior and 57 Slovenian police officers. A questionnaire was used to identify police officers' opinion on the extent of different forms of extremism/radicalization existing in their countries in general and their opinion on religious extremism/radicalisation in Slovenia and Croatia.

Keywords: *police, radicalization, perception, Slovenia, Croatia*

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INTRODUCTION

Until recent years, research and policy debate primarily focused on preventing terrorism (Macaluso, 2016). Only in the last decade have terms such as radicalization and violent extremism emerged in researches, literature and policy debates (Macaluso, 2016; Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015; Butt & Tuck, 2014; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Violent extremism is a general term that refers to any violence that is inspired by ideological beliefs including, but not limited to political ideology (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015; Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya, 2011). Countering violent extremism refers to soft power approaches to ideologically driven violence (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015). Radicalization is a process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the achievement of particular goals justifies the use of violence (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010).

As police play a crucial role in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, and while respecting the need for international police cooperation in this task, the purpose of this paper is to compare Croatian and Slovenian police officers' perceptions of various forms of radicalisation and extremism in Slovenia and Croatia.

Local dimension to radicalisation and violent extremism

There is always a local dimension to radicalisation and violent extremism: it always happens somewhere, whether it is the place where radicals and extremists hide, find support and operate, or where an individual or a group becomes involved with radicalization and violent extremism ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014; Sageman, 2008). A local approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalisation that leads to terrorism (VERLT) is necessary along to the ongoing regional and international strategies ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014; Butt & Tuck, 2014). Countries have sought to identify where to concentrate their efforts in trying to allocate resources better and improve the effectiveness of their action against radicalisation and violent extremism ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014; Sedgwick, 2010). Communities have suddenly become the centre of attention in the formulation and implementation of radicalization and violent extremism prevention policies ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). The above-mentioned leads to a conclusion on the importance of putting a community at the centre of countering radicalization and violent extremism policies and measures, as well as the development of community-based approaches, with emphasis on prevention and development of partnerships with public ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014).

Traditionally, countering radicalization and violent extremism policies and practices have been community-targeted, namely targeting communities for intelligence-gathering and enforcement activities driven by the security priorities

of the country ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). Such activities, however, involve little or no consultation with members and groups from the public, and are not aimed at gaining trust and support from people (men and women) in local communities and rarely take into consideration their diverse need or how they are differently affected by terrorism and measures against it ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). (Macaluso, 2016)

Radicalisation and violent extremism is a threat to the public at large and, consequently, to all communities ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). Acts of radicalization and violent extremism do not only impact communities and their members, but radicals and extremists also need to find support, sympathizers and recruits from the public to be able to carry out their plans ([OSCE], Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014).

Local police

Struggle against radicalization and violent extremism was usually an exclusive task for security sector agencies (Prislan, Černigoj, & Lobnikar, 2018). Today, the police have taken a key role in facilitating a preventive multi-stakeholder approach at the local or regional level, particularly in at-risk local settings (Prislan, Černigoj, & Lobnikar, 2018; Butterfoss & Kegler, 2009).

Police is a crucial factor in preventing and countering radicalization and violent extremism. Community policing is a proper strategy to counter radicalization and violent extremism because it genuinely requires building a partnership with the private sector and with communities (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015).

Quality partnership with the public offers enormous opportunities for countries to gather intelligence and to share information (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015). Community policing poses less risk as it builds upon trust and community partnership (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015). Traditional policing poses a higher risk than community policing in terms of destroying democratic principles (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015). Nevertheless, the main goal of maintaining community participation requires a focus on building trust rather than gathering intelligence (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015).

Community policing assumes the presence of contact police officers who have a permanent patrolling area where they rely on proactive and cooperative relations with citizens in order to observe and resolve problems in the area.

Police officers' views on preventing and countering radicalization and violent extremism

Police officers' positive attitudes towards community policing are crucial to the success of that strategy (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015). Police officers' perception

of community policing determines their function becoming aligned with the objectives of community policing (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015). The police redefine their role as they adopt community policing (Sozer, Sevinc, & Ozeren, 2015).

Traditionally, local police are not viewed and perceived as a factor of prevention. Community policing is a strategy that changes the view of the role of police officers' in the direction of police being a public service and changing the role of citizens and the local community in creating and maintaining security.

Croatian and Slovenian Police

Croatia as a Central European and Mediterranean country has gone through War for Independence in the early 1990s and became an internationally recognized parliamentary democratic republic (Kovčo Vukadin, Borovec, & Ljubin Golub, 2013).

Croatian police are highly centralized police, structured and operating within the Ministry of the Interior as an administrative organization for carrying out police affairs (Kovčo Vukadin, Borovec, & Ljubin Golub, 2013). The Croatian police force is hierarchically organized at three levels: (1) General Police Directorate, (2) Police Administrations, and (3) Police Stations (Kovčo Vukadin, Borovec, & Ljubin Golub, 2013).

Slovenia is a Central European Country which declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 (Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013). Since then, Slovenian police have gone through many attempts of reforms in order to move closer to the western style of policing (Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013).

The police organization in Slovenia is centralized, with one national and state-funded police force, leaving local authorities with almost no influence in that area (Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013; Durić & Šumi, 2018). All police stations are state-level units, which operate at the local level (Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013). The local government has no control over their operation or the appointment of their commanders (Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013). While such centralization feasibly eased the management of reforms from a central level, it also conflicted with the new policing strategy that the police adopted – community policing (Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013).

We can characterize Croatian and Slovenian police as relatively modern and professional law enforcement services far closer to their western counterparts than to the past communist “militia”, a military-like organization in the service of protecting the ruling elite (Meško, Lobnikar, Jere, & Sotlar, 2013). Both Croatian and Slovenian police are public services serving citizens at the local community level by adopting community policing strategy.

Methodology Sample

The study was conducted on a sample of 117 students of the Croatian Police College of the Ministry of the Interior and 57 Slovenian police officers to evaluate the perceptions of police officers about various forms of radicalization and extremism in Slovenia and Croatia. All respondents were involved in the training process for the prevention of radicalization and extreme violence in 2017 (Slovenian subsample) and 2018 (Croatian subsample).

Instrument

The study used a questionnaire developed in the First Line – a project intended for training of various stakeholders in the area of radicalisation and violent extremism. The questionnaire was adapted to suit each country's environment, including altering different parts of the questionnaire.

Within the framework of the bilateral Slovenia – Croatia project “The Community Policing and the Role of the Police in Preventing Violent Radicalization in Slovenia and Croatia” a 4-hour training session was prepared. The participants were presented the latest trends concerning terrorist attacks in Europe and different approaches to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. Participants were interviewed at both the start and end of the training to determine how the training had influenced their knowledge and attitudes regarding the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism. For this study, we are using data collected from interviewing the respondents after attending the 4-hour training session.

Results

Results show an analysis of the perception of police officers about various forms of radicalization and extremism in Slovenia and Croatia.

Table 1 shows that the Croatian respondents in considerable measure (Mean 3.29; SD = 0.80) do not know anything or know very little about extremism, violent extremism and the process of radicalisation while the Slovenian respondents assess that they know a great deal (Mean 3.82; SD = 0.66) about extremism, violent extremism and the process of radicalisation. It is essential to mention that the Slovenian respondents did not answer the first two sections of offered 5-point scale, which brings us to a big difference in assessing their knowledge.

Table 1: *Knowledge about extremism, violent extremism and the process of radicalisation*

	Croatia	Slovenia
I do not know anything	1.9 %	-
2	12.1 %	-
3	44.9 %	32.0 %
4	37.4 %	54.0 %
I know a great deal	3.7 %	14.0 %
Mean	3.29	3.82
t = 4.33; p = 0,000; stat. significant		

Table 2 shows a big difference in assessing the impact of injustice in the world on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual. The Croatian respondents mainly assess (Mean 3.02; SD = 1.09) that there is a weak or no impact on the development of extremism, while the Slovenian respondents mainly assess (Mean 3.82; SD = 0.93) that there is a strong impact of injustice in the world on the development of extremism. A big difference can be the result of no Slovenian respondents answering to the first section of the given 5-point scale.

Table 2: *Injustice in world impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	6.5 %	-
2	28.7 %	11.8 %
3	30.6 %	17.6 %
4	23.1 %	47.1 %
Strong impact	11.1 %	23.5 %
Mean	3.02	3.82
t = 4.76; p = 0.000; stat. significant		

Table 3 brings us an almost identical assessment of the Croatian respondents (Mean 3.36; SD = 1.01) and the Slovenian respondents (Mean 3.39; SD = 0.94) on financial/economic crisis impact on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual. Both groups of respondents consider that there is a weak or no impact of the financial/economic crisis on the mentioned matter.

Table 3: *Financial/economic crisis impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	3.7 %	-
2	13.9 %	19.6 %
3	39.8 %	33.3 %
4	27.8 %	35.3 %
Strong impact	14.8 %	11.8 %
Mean	3.36	3.39
t = 0.18; p = 0.85; not stat. significant		

Table 4 shows quite a difference in the assessment of political disagreements in the world and their impact on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual between the two groups of respondents. The Slovenian respondents considerably more (Mean 3.86; SD = 0.77) assess that there is the impact of political disagreements in the world on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual, while the Croatian respondents assess the same problem closer to weak or no impact (Mean 3.59; SD = 0.98).

Table 4: *Political disagreements in the world impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	2.8 %	-
2	11.1 %	3.9 %
3	25.9 %	25.5 %
4	44.4 %	51.0 %
Strong impact	15.7 %	19.6 %
Mean	3.59	3.86
t = 1.82; p = 0.07; not quite statistically significant		

The Slovenian respondents (Mean 3.16; SD = 1.06), as opposed to the Croatian respondents (Mean 3.31; SD = 1.08), assess that impact of political disagreements in the local environment has a weaker or no impact on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual (Table 5).

Table 5: *Political disagreements in the local environment impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	5.6 %	5.9 %
2	17.6 %	19.6 %
3	31.5 %	39.2 %
4	31.5 %	23.5 %
Strong impact	13.9 %	11.8 %
Mean	3.31	3.16
t = 0.86; p = 0.38; not stat. significant		

Table 6 shows that both Croatian (Mean 4.06; SD = 0.82) and Slovenian (Mean 4.02; SD = 0.76) respondents have a similar assessment, both groups of respondents claim that there is a strong impact of religious or other ideological indoctrination of people on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual.

Table 6: *Religious or other ideological indoctrination of people impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	-	-
2	1.9 %	2.0 %
3	25.2 %	21.6 %
4	38.3 %	49.0 %
Strong impact	34.6 %	27.5 %
Mean	4.06	4.02
t = 0.31; p = 0.75; not stat. significant		

Table 7 brings up a huge difference between the two groups of respondents. While Croatian respondents' asses weaker or no impact (Mean 3.86; SD = 0.92) of promotion/fuelling of hatred by political leaders impact on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual, Slovenian respondents mainly asses mentioned impact as strong (Mean 4.22; SD = 0.75).

Table 7: *Promotion/fuelling of hatred by political leaders' impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	0.9 %	-
2	6.5 %	-
3	25.0 %	19.6 %
4	40.7 %	39.2 %
Strong impact	26.9 %	41.2 %
Mean	3.86	4.22
t = 2.57; p = 0.01; stat. significant		

In table 8, it is evident that both groups of respondents assess the impact of propaganda by religious leaders on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual very similarly. Both groups, Slovenian (Mean 4.00; SD = 0.95) and Croatian (4.04; SD = 0.89), claim that there is a strong impact. It is interesting to mention that no respondents, in either of the two samples, find that there is no impact of propaganda by religious leaders.

Table 8: *Propaganda by religious leaders impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	-	-
2	6.5 %	6.0 %
3	18.5 %	26.0 %
4	39.8 %	30.0 %
Strong impact	35.2 %	38.0 %
Mean	4.04	4.00
t = 0.27; p = 0.78; stat. significant		

Table 9 shows that the Croatian respondents (Mean 3.11; SD = 1.08) tend to consider the impact of an individual's feeling of powerlessness on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual as weaker or as non-existing. On the contrary, the Slovenian respondents (Mean 3.96; SD = 0.80) consider the impact of an individual's feeling of powerlessness on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual as strong. In addition, there is no Slovenian respondent who assesses the mentioned impact as non-existing.

Table 9: *Individual's feeling of powerlessness impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	6.5 %	-
2	20.4 %	2.0 %
3	42.6 %	28.0 %
4	16.7 %	42.0 %
Strong impact	13.9 %	28.0 %
Mean	3.11	3.96
t = 5.27; p = 0.000; stat. significant		

Table 10 shows the respondents rather similar answers about an individual's characteristics/personality impact on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual. The Slovenian respondents' (Mean 3.92; SD = 0.85) assessment of mentioned impact is closer to stronger, while the Croatian respondents' assessment of the impact of an individual's personality on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalization of an individual is closer to weak or non-existing (Mean 3.43; SD = 1.02).

Table 10: *Individual's characteristics/personality impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	1.9 %	-
2	17.8 %	4.2 %
3	31.8 %	27.1 %
4	32.7 %	41.7 %
Strong impact	15.9 %	27.1 %
Mean	3.43	3.92
t = 3.13; p = 0.002; stat. significant		

Table 11 presents the results of the respondents' assessment of the impact of reporting in the media (newspapers, TV) on the development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual. Both Croatian (Mean 3.73; SD = 0.96) and Slovenian (Mean 3.84; SD = 0.86) respondents share the similar assessment that there is almost strong impact of reporting in the media, but there is not even one Slovenian respondent who assesses that there is no impact.

Table 11: *Reporting in the media (newspapers, TV) impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	1.9 %	-
2	7.4 %	5.9 %
3	29.6 %	27.5 %
4	38.0 %	43.1 %
Strong impact	23.1 %	23.5 %
Mean	3.73	3.84
t = 0.73; p = 0.46; not stat. significant		

When we look at the results of respondents assessment (Table 12) of Online propaganda (the Internet, FB, Twitter) impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual, we notice similar assessment of the mentioned impact in both subsamples of respondents, both the Croatian (Mean 4.08; SD = 0.89) and Slovenian (Mean 4.16; SD = 0.81) respondents claim the mentioned impact to be strong.

Table 12: *Online propaganda (Internet, FB, Twitter) impact on development of extremism and strengthening the radicalisation of an individual*

	Croatia	Slovenia
No impact	0.9 %	-
2	5.6 %	3.9 %
3	21.3 %	13.7 %
4	37.0 %	45.1 %
Strong impact	35.2 %	37.3 %
Mean	4.08	4.16
t = 0.57; p = 0.56; not stat. significant		

Table 13 shows that the respondents, Slovenian (Mean 2.96; SD = 0.94) and Croatian (Mean 2.83; SD = 1.03) are of the opinion that left extremism is not dangerous. While at all sections of the question the respondents give matching answers, the biggest difference is noticeable at assessing left extremism as not at all dangerous, where a bigger percentage of respondents belongs to Croatia.

Table 13: *Own opinion on how serious left extremism is.*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	10.2 %	3.9 %
2	25.0 %	29.4 %
3	43.5 %	37.3 %
4	13.9 %	25.5 %
Very dangerous	7.4 %	3.9 %
Mean	2.83	2.96
t = 0.80; p = 0.422; not stat. significant		

Table 14 brings a notably big difference in the assessment of how serious the right extremism is. The Slovenian respondents (Mean 3.43; SD = 0.87) have assessed that right extremism is dangerous if not very dangerous, while the Croatian respondents (Mean 2.84; SD = 0.98) assess that right extremism is not very dangerous or not dangerous at all.

Table 14: *Own opinion on how serious right extremism is.*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	11.1 %	2.0 %
2	18.5 %	11.8 %
3	50.0 %	35.3 %
4	15.7 %	43.1 %
Very dangerous	4.6 %	7.8 %
Mean	2.84	3.43
t = 4.19; p = 0.000; stat. significant		

Table 15 brings up a similar assessment of the Slovenian (Mean 3.37; SD = 1.07) and Croatian (Mean 3.23; SD = 1.25) respondents, where both groups consider religious extremism as very little or not at all dangerous.

Table 15: *Own opinion on how serious religious extremism is.*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	10.3 %	2.0 %
2	17.8 %	23.5 %
3	30.8 %	25.5 %
4	20.6 %	33.3 %
Very dangerous	20.6 %	15.7 %
Mean	3.23	3.37
t = 0.72; p = 0.469; not stat. significant		

Both Croatian (Mean 2.31; SD = 1.04) and Slovenian (Mean 2.10; SD = 0.85) respondents (Table 16) are of the opinion that environmental extremism is not very serious or not at all dangerous. It is interesting to mention that none of the Slovenian respondents assessed environmental extremism as very dangerous.

Table 16: *Own opinion on how serious environmental extremism is.*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	25.9 %	27.5 %
2	30.6 %	39.2 %
3	33.3 %	29.4 %
4	6.5 %	3.9 %
Very dangerous	3.7 %	-
Mean	2.31	2.10
t = 1.32; p = 0.187; not stat. significant		

Table 17 brings almost matching estimates of the seriousness of extremism linked to nationality. Slovenian (Mean 3,22; SD = 1,11) and Croatian (Mean 3,30; SD = 1,04) respondents assessed extremism linked to nationality as not dangerous, but it is essential to mention that none of the Slovenian respondents assessed extremism linked to nationality as not at all dangerous.

Table 17: *Own opinion on how serious extremism linked to nationality is.*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	5.6 %	-
2	15.7 %	35.3 %
3	33.3 %	25.5 %
4	34.3 %	21.6 %
Very dangerous	11.1 %	17.6 %
Mean	3.30	3.22
t = 0.46; p = 0.64; not stat. significant		

While assessing the extent to which Catholic religious extremism is dangerous in the respondent's country (Table 18), we see that regardless of whether a respondent comes from Croatia or Slovenia, we get almost matching results. Neither Croatian (Mean 2.25; SD = 1.10) nor Slovenian (Mean 2.14; SD = 0.90) respondents consider Catholic religious extremism as dangerous. Also, there are none of the respondents in the Slovenian subsample that assess Catholic religious extremism as dangerous.

Table 18: *Extent to which Catholic religious extremism is dangerous in the respondent's country*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	31.5 %	26.0 %
2	27.8 %	42.0 %
3	28.7 %	24.0 %
4	8.3 %	8.0 %
Very dangerous	3.7 %	-
Mean	2.25	2.14
t = 0.65; p = 0.51; not stat. significant		

Table 19 presents that Croatian respondents (Mean 3.48; SD = 1.27) assess Islamic religious extremism closely to being dangerous as opposed to the Slovenian respondents (Mean 3.27; SD = 1.04). When comparing answers to “Very dangerous” particle of 5-point scale, we notice that 26.9% of the Croatian respondents consider Islamic religious extremism to be very dangerous, while at the same time only 11.8% of the Slovenian respondents consider Islamic religious extremism to be very dangerous.

Table 19: *Extent to which Islamic religious extremism is dangerous in respondent's country*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	7.4 %	2.0 %
2	18.5 %	25.5 %
3	19.4 %	27.5 %
4	27.8 %	33.3 %
Very dangerous	26.9 %	11.8 %
Mean	3.48	3.27
t = 1.08; p = 0.28; not stat. significant		

Table 20 shows a big difference between two groups of respondents in assessing the extent to which Jewish religious extremism is dangerous. Both (Croatia Mean 2.28; SD = 1.13; Slovenia Mean 1.57; SD = 0.78) groups assess Jewish religious extremism as not very or not at all dangerous. None of the Slovenian respondents estimated Jewish religious extremism as very dangerous.

Table 20: *Extent to which Jewish religious extremism is dangerous in respondent's country*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	28.7 %	56.9 %
2	34.3 %	33.3 %
3	23.1 %	5.9 %
4	8.3 %	3.9 %
Very dangerous	5.6 %	-
Mean	2.28	1.57
t = 4.27; p = 0.000; stat. significant		

Table 21 presents results according to which Protestant religious extremism is not assessed as dangerous by either the Croatian (Mean 2.27; SD = 1.10) or Slovenian (Mean 1.55; SD = 0.88) respondents. When we look at the answers listed as 1 (not at all dangerous) on a 5-point scale, we notice a big difference – the Croatian respondents in a smaller percentage, 28.7%, think that Protestant religious extremism is not at all dangerous, while 62.7% of the Slovenian respondents consider Protestant religious extremism no to be at all dangerous.

Table 21: *Extent to which Protestant religious extremism is dangerous in respondent's country*

	Croatia	Slovenia
Not at all dangerous	28.7 %	62.7 %
2	32.4 %	25.5 %
3	27.8 %	7.8 %
4	5.6 %	2.0 %
Very dangerous	5.6 %	2.0 %
Mean	2.27	1.55
t = 4.31; p = 0.000; stat. significant		

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results indicate the contextual differences between the two countries, Croatia and Slovenia. Thus, because of the situation in their own state, Croats are less sensitive to injustice in the world, financial/economic crises, political disagreements, promotion/fueling of hatred by political leaders. Because of the country context, Croats assess right and religious extremism as less serious or dangerous.

Results indicate that the Slovenian respondents are better informed and educated on the topics of extremism, violent extremism and the process of radicalisation, while Croatian respondents know less about the same topics. This difference can be solved by additional training.

It is obvious that there are topics about which both Slovenian and Croatian respondents know very little. It is the topic of environmental extremism, about which the respondents can be informed by additional training, but also through co-operation of the local community with local police.

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